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When I was approached by the Sir William DaleCentre for Legislative Studies of the Institute ofAdvanced Legal studies over a year ago to
deliver the Sir William Dale Annual Lecture for 2006, I
should have heeded the sage advice of Lewis Carroll’s
young man, when he addressed his father:
“You are old, Father William”, the young man said,
“And your hair has become very white;
And yet you incessantly stand on your head –
Do you think, at your age, it is right?”
“In my youth,” Father William replied to his son,
“I feared it might injure the brain;
But now that I’m perfectly sure I have none,
Why, I do it again and again.”
The fact that I am here with you tonight reflects my
tendency towards perversity – I continue to frustrate my
guardians. There are three reasons for this. First, there was
a personal need to return after more than 40 years to the
Institute for Advanced Legal Studies, where I spent a
delightful year, as an LSE student, using your great library
and being bemused by the Schwarzenberger onslaught on
the Oppenheimer school of international law. It would be
interesting to be beguiled by that wily central European’s
view of international law today. Thank you to the Centre
for the invitation.
Second, it is an honour to be asked to deliver this lecture
in memory of Sir William Dale in this hundredth year of
his birth. He was, it seems, a man who anticipated a
number of the developments and challenges of which I
hope to speak tonight. Having worked and spent time in
Palestine, in Sarawak, in Libya and in Central Africa, in
addition to his native England, it would seem hard to
imagine that he was not appreciative of the diversity of
ways being, of living in community, of configuring society
and pursuing the good that exist in our world.
And yet he also very obviously appreciated the need for
stable, reliable legal systems – for the rule of law – to
operate within such diverse cultures and societies. Sir
William was, after all, the man who conceptualized and
went on to run for many years the Government Legal
Advisors’ course in which legal training, particularly in
respect of legislation and international law, was provided to
officials from developing states within the Commonwealth.
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But if much of the last century was taken up with the
project of preparing newly-independent states, new
democracies, with the means, legal and other otherwise, of
addressing the challenges of modern governance, the
legacy of colonialism, of newly minted nationality; it
seemed, as the old century made way for the new, as if the
post-independence project was replaced with an entirely
new one. This project addressed both developing and
developed country alike, as in part through the migrations
fueled by colonialism, very few states could claim ethno- or
cultural-homogeneity. The new project – the word “new”
is misleading for it suggests that societies have not dealt
with these questions over the ages – has, in the
considerable public discussion devoted to it, been given the
term “multiculturalism.”
So I come to my third reason for being here. When the
African National Congress began to draw up a draft Bill of
Rights and the constitutional principles which would guide
our negotiating positions, we had to tackle challenges –
how to legislate diversity; how to adjudicate difference – in
a country with a baasskap identity. This issue is only now
moving to the forefront of politics and society in Europe.
PRESSURES OF GLOBALIZATION
Globilization, while no doubt an ugly word, has
enormously shaped this new terrain. Pressures of
globalization have given many communities, individuals
and cultures a feeling of threat and marginalization. There
is no point in denying this. These forces cannot be turned
back. We need to define, just as we have in terms of
individual rights, a balancing new concept of cultural
diversity, liberty and rights. We need to do this not only
because of corrosive risks – from radically new patterns of
international migration, for example – but because
“identity” politics is one of the most dangerous forces now
at play. In Europe, in particular, there is an intense exercise
in many countries to identify so-called “core values” faced
by “alien forces.” Issues of “us” and “them” remain a razor
sharp division embedded, all too often, in the landscape of
nations and the wider international community.
It has received enormous attention over recent weeks
here in Britain with Chancellor Gordon Brown seeking to
articulate a “British national identity” that “everyone
should learn Magna Carta,” poor Jack Straw having cultural
problems with Muslim women wearing their veils when
consulting with him in his constituency, and your
education secretary prescribing “non-negotiable British”
values. More seriously, and no less dangerously, the issue of
unresolved minority integration in Europe keeps coming
up as a set theme in threat analysis.
If one were partial to Samuel Huntington-like
distinctions (and I myself am not) one might suppose that
South Africa represents the tail-end of the post-
independence project, its great triumph, but that it might
be relegated footnote-status in the intellectual endeavour
devoted to multiculturalism. I would disagree. The
dynamics which give rise to these projects can hardly be
separated and I would suggest, with requisite modesty of
course, that there is reason to closely observe how South
Africa seeks, by its new Constitution and by its laws and
practices to meet what I have referred to, for ease of
reference, as the multicultural project – although I fear
that this may suggest that South Africa’s constitution and
multiculturalism are things apart.
My address is entitled “The South African Constitution
and the transition from apartheid: legislating the
reconciliation of rights in a multicultural society.” But it
might also be titled, to borrow from L P Hartley’s famous
opening line in The Go-Between, “The past is another
country,” because as I will argue, it is the construction of
our society on the basis of a shared vision of the future,
rather than on any mythologizing of our past, that best
guarantees a peaceful, just, multicultural society in which
each is offered the best chance for flourishing and
fulfillment.
Many of you familiar with South Africa’s Constitution
will know that we celebrate its tenth anniversary this year.
It is a Constitution that speaks both of the past and to the
future. It guarantees civil and political rights (called first-
generation rights) and holds out the realization of social
and economic rights (called second generation rights). It
promises protection of the rights which best guarantee our
freedom to be individuals, unlike any other, but also the
rights we enjoy only in and through our communities –
that protect our enjoyment of the society of those like
ourselves.
I must emphasise that those of us involved in the
multiparty negotiations that led to the enactment of the
Constitution and who had fought against apartheid were
determined to fashion a founding document that enabled
South Africans to participate in and enjoy, in every sense,
their diverse communities – continuing a tradition which
had seen the Freedom Charter declare that “South Africa
belongs to all those who live in it,” and that all South
Africans had the right to their own languages and to
develop their own cultures and customs.
In some sense, this determination on our part might
have seemed counter-intuitive. After all we had come from
an apartheid past under which difference was not erased,
but was, in fact, elevated – our difference becoming our
defining feature, the basis on which the state determined
the rights, resources and level of care we were due.
CONSTITUTIONAL OBJECTIVE FOR A
UNIFIED SOUTH AFRICA
It is this history of division, of separation, that made it
so essential that the new Constitutional order have as its
objective a unified South Africa. But as the preamble states,
we were to be united in our diversity. There was never a
question that South Africa adopt a policy of assimilation – 27
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that we would seek to erase difference. To do so would
have merely perpetuated a system of inequality and
dominance. As A Sivanandan explained recently in The
Guardian, a policy of assimilation “is one that deems there
is one dominant culture, one unique set of values, one
nativist loyalty.”
South Africa’s break with the past did not involve then a
denial of difference. South Africans instead were free to
celebrate it, but without it determining the rights,
resources and level of care to which they are due. Of these
goods, we are each guaranteed equal claim, irrespective of
our difference. We have, as has been underlined by Justice
Sachs, the right to be the same and the right to be different.
This pluralist and multicultural vision for South Africa
has been criticised by some precisely because it is said to
accentuate difference: “Rather than unite the
disempowered, multiculturalism emphasises social
divisions and exaggerates cultural differences among them.
In this scenario, the politics of identity is counter-
productive to nation-building.”
I strongly disagree. Multiculturalism in South Africa is to
be valued – not only because we recognize that life in our
modern world makes for multiple allegiances and loyalties
that are enriching and because individuals require different
means to develop their fullest abilities. But it is to be valued
because a society in which each is able to demonstrate her
difference and diversity equally is a society much more
likely to encourage its members to see beyond signifiers of
religion, race or ethnicity as the sole markers of identity.
For these reasons – in pursuit of a genuinely
multicultural society – South Africa’s Constitution
provides for detailed language protections in the founding
provisions, establishes a Commission for the Promotion
and Protection of the Rights of Cultural, Religious and
Linguistic Communities, and inscribes a host of rights in
the Bill of Rights that have relevance to our ability to
participate in and enjoy diverse communities – such as
equality, dignity, freedom of association. However, the
South African Constitution most explicitly protects
multiculturalism (and here I mean multiculturalism in the
narrow sense of bestowing special rights and privileges on
minority cultures and ways of life) in two separate types of
provision. It guarantees community or multicultural rights
along two different axes.
The first provisions flow from the orthodox type of
religious freedom clause that finds its genesis in the earliest
documents seeking to inscribe the rights of humankind.
South Africa’s provision protecting the right of every
person to freedom of conscience, religion, thought, belief
and opinion admittedly entitles persons to do so all on
their own but, in practice, it guarantees a right that
generally only has meaning and value when shared in
community with others, however small that community
may be. The Constitution also similarly guarantees the
right of each person to use the language and participate in
the cultural life of their choice. Under these provisions (see
s 15), it is the individual’s right to have a belief or opinion,
to use a language, or to practice a culture, in community
with others that is promised.
But the Constitution, in an entirely different section,
and in line with much more recent human rights
documents, also guarantees the rights of persons belonging
to cultural, religious or linguistic communities – qua
community – to practise their culture, faith or language
and to undertake activities that would promote such
community (see s 31). Under South Africa’s Constitution
individuals’ rights to participate in community are thus
protected, as is the community’s right to exist, to engage in
its practices, traditions and belief as a community.
How these sections interrelate, how the internal
limitations clauses function as opposed to the general
limitations clause contained in the Bill of Rights – whereby
rights may be limited provided such limitation is
reasonable and justifiable in an open and democratic
society based on human dignity, equality and freedom – are
issues our courts have only begun to deal with. Yet already
they have faced some peculiarly difficult questions.
At a time when I was Minister of Education, a Christian
education alliance challenged the ban on corporal
punishment in schools, including private religious
institutions, arguing that this violated their rights to
religious freedom – as individuals and as community. The
Constitutional Court issued a decision on the basis that,
assuming in petitioners’ favour that physical chastisement
did constitute a genuine religious belief and that the
prohibition on such punishment constituted an
infringement, such infringement was nonetheless
reasonable and justifiable in an open and democratic
society based on human dignity, equality and freedom.
However, I do not propose here to explore the workings
and possible interpretations of specific clauses in South
Africa’s constitution. Nor do I propose examining the core
values that animate our constitution – human dignity,
equality, freedom, non-racism and non-sexism – despite
their very obvious and tremendous importance in making
for a country in which diverse groups and communities
find their home. Rather my intention is to outline an
approach or ethos, a critical way of thinking, that must
guide all three branches of government – the courts’
jurisprudence, Parliament’s legislative function and the
executive’s action – in reconciling rights within our
multicultural society.
South Africa’s Constitution is unequivocally what Ruti
Teitel has called a “transitional constitution” – both
backward- and forward-looking (see Ruti Teitel,
“Transitional jurisprudence: the role of law in political
transformation,” (1997) 106 Yale Law Journal 2009 at 2015
and also at 2078: “In ordinary times constitutionalism is
conceived as entirely forward-looking in nature, designed
to endure for generations. Constitutionalism in transitional28
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times is particularly retrospective in nature, justificatory
and constructive of the political transformation”). But it is
backward-looking only in that it involves a repudiation of
an undemocratic and illiberal past. And a repudiation of
the past requires the construction or marshalling of
reasons in the present-day in order to justify the rejection
of values and practices of the past. This transitional
constitutional project is not about safeguarding, making
inviolable the traditions and practices of our past. It is not
a reification of history.
Obviously, we in South Africa especially want to reclaim
and restore histories that have been negated – histories of
marginalized groups and societies. But I would venture that
in our constitutional project – in the courts’
jurisprudence, in Parliament’s considerations for enacting
legislation – we should be unapologetic in our reference to
South Africa’s shared future, and what we want that to look
like, and how it involves departure from our past, as
justification for our decisions. This mode of reasoning – an
articulation of the society we are reaching for – bears sharp
parallels with what South African legal scholar, Etienne
Mureinik, called a “culture of justification,” a culture he
and other South African human rights lawyers hoped
would be firmly entrenched by a Bill of Rights. As he
explained:
“they have been looking to [the Bill of Rights] not only for its
explicit content, but also to enrich laws by fostering
justification-thinking, because it was the poverty of law, in the
shape of pervasive authority-thinking that made apartheid
possible. A Bill of Rights, they have been hoping, would
restore discipline to a legal system grown slothful about
justification” (Etienne Mureinik, “Emerging from emergency:
human rights in South Africa,” (1994) 92 Michigan Law
Review 1977 at 1986).
Were it to be otherwise, were it our past (even a
mythical past), and not the future, that was our lodestar,
then I fear we would venture too close to divisive,
contemporary political projects, as seen in Britain today
with the espousal of “British values,” what Chancellor
Gordon Brown has called “a clear shared vision of national
identity.” This imagining of Britain, based on its
rediscovery (a redrawing, if you like) of its past brings with
it the alienation of many immigrants and communities who
have had no place in the Britain that gave rise to such
“values” – many whose own experience, anyway, would
necessarily refute the imagining of a Britain that has always
held dear the values of liberty, tolerance and social justice
– and who, by virtue of their multiple identities, and
sometimes conflicting allegiances, must necessarily contest
this “clear, shared vision of national identity”.
JUDICIAL AWARENESS OF THE NEED FOR A
SHARED FUTURE
Recently in a case that continues to generate much
debate in South Africa involving the right of same-sex
couples to marry, the Constitutional Court showed itself
acutely conscious of the need to formulate a jurisprudence
that speaks to a shared future, that is formulated in
response, as a rejection of what was unconscionable in our
past. Justice Sachs, writing for the court in Minister of Home
Affairs and Another v Fourie and Another (Doctors for Life
International and others, Amicus Curiae); Lesbian and Gay
Equality Project and Others v Minister of Home Affairs and Others,
CCT 60/04; CCT 10/05, at para 59 noted:
“Our Constitution represents a radical rupture with the past
based on intolerance and exclusion, and the movement
forward to the acceptance of the need to develop a society
based on equality and respect by all for all. Small gestures in
favour of equality, however meaningful, are not enough. In
the memorable words of Mahomed J:
‘In some countries, the Constitution only formalizes, in a
legal instrument, a historical consensus of values and
aspirations evolved incrementally from a stable and unbroken
past to accommodate the needs of the future. The South
African Constitution is different: it retains from the past only
what is defensible and represents a decisive break from, and
ringing rejection of, that part of the past that is disgracefully
racist, authoritarian, insular and repressive and a vigorous
identification with and commitment to a democratic,
universalistic, caring and aspirationally egalitarian ethos
expressly articulated in the Constitution. The contrast between
the past which it repudiates and the future to which it seeks
to commit the nation is stark and dramatic.’”
The past should be referenced not only in order to
applaud traditions we wish to preserve but to stare down
the spectre that we as a society are determined to avoid. As
Justice Mahomed made clear, in South Africa, our
constitutional justification should be unequivocally
aspirational, future-bound, preserving from the past only
that which is justifiable. And while this style of reasoning,
of justification, may seem especially suited to South Africa,
I would suggest that it is fitting for much of the world as
well.
In our public life and discourse, in our laws and
jurisprudence, we need to encourage a culture of
justification that seeks to shape a shared future based on a
very critical examination of our past. This culture of
reasoning or justification is much less likely to alienate
peoples whose cultures and societies are not well
represented in our past – at least our official past. And it
means that peoples who make their homes in South Africa
today, without any representation in our past, are much
more likely to find a place, a sense not just of being, but of
well-being, in South Africa, as they too participate, as full
members, in articulating a vision of a shared future.
I have proceeded thus far in my lecture with reference
to multiculturalism as if its value were self-evident. Indeed,
for many of us that value is self-evident and if not self-
evident it is at the very least an inevitable outcome.
Nonetheless it is worth rehearsing why we would want to 29
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embrace multiculturalism, a diversity of ways of living
within society. And here I would suggest, that as the great
South African Bram Fischer spoke of nationalism, that it is
“if anything a means to an end, and before we seek to
further it we must have some idea of the end for which we
are striving”, so we should think of multiculturalism and
diversity: not as ends in themselves but as means to an end.
It was as means to an end that John Stuart Mill
celebrated diversity within society in his work On Liberty,
more than a century and a half ago:
“If it were only that people have diversities of taste that is
reason enough for not attempting to shape them all after one
model. But different persons also require different conditions
for their spiritual development: and can no more exist
healthily in the same moral, than all the variety of plants can
exist in the same physical, atmosphere and climate. The same
things which are helps to one person towards the cultivation
of his higher nature, are hindrances to another. Unless there
is a corresponding diversity in their modes of life, they can
neither obtain their fair share of happiness, nor grow up to
the mental, moral, and aesthetic stature of which their nature
is capable” (John Stuart Mill, On Liberty in Essays on
Politics and Society, ed John M Robson, vol 18 of The
Collected Works of John Stuart Mill, University of Toronto
Press (1977), p 270).
This defence has been updated by scholars like Will
Kymlicka, the foremost contemporary proponent of
cultural collective rights. He has argued that these groups
have “societal cultures” that provide “members with
meaningful ways of life across the range of human
activities, including social, educational, religious,
recreational, and economic life, encompassing both public
and private spheres” – see Multicultural Citizenship: A Liberal
Theory of Minority Rights, Oxford University Press (1995),
p 76 – and that membership within rich and secure
cultural structures, with their own languages, histories and
cultures, is essential both for the development of self-
respect, and for giving persons the means by which they
can develop the abilities to make choices about how to lead
their lives and realize their fullest potential.
We therefore value multiculturalism because we want to
preserve a wide range of human conditions, allowing free
people the best chance to make their own lives. And it is
not only that we seek to value allegiances of long-standing,
that cut across the reductive classifications of nationality,
but also to value contemporary trends towards global
citizenship; as evidenced by the growth of the human rights
movement, new forms of women’s citizenship and of
ecological citizenship. (For a more comprehensive account
of these loyalties and allegiances, see my Bram Fischer
Memorial Lecture for 2004, “Globalisation, Human Rights
and the African Diaspora”, Oxford, July 9, 2004).
CRITICISMS OF THE MULTICULTURAL
PROJECT
Notwithstanding these very obvious benefits, there
remain a number of critics, many of them whose intentions
and qualifications cannot be gainsaid, of the multicultural
project. They do so chiefly on two grounds: first that the
rights accruing to such groups in democratic societies,
protect and shore up groups and communities who seek to
undo democracy, and who use those selfsame rights and
liberties in order to destabilize democracies. This line of
criticism has attracted greater currency in the wake of
September 11 and the London bombs of July 2005.
The second set of critics argue that the extension of
special recognition and rights to minority cultures might
enable oppression of vulnerable individuals – such as
women and children – within the group and shield such
discrimination from outside scrutiny. I want to attempt
what must necessarily be a brief response to both sets of
critics.
In respect of the first set of critics – those who hold out
the spectre of fundamentalism (principally Islamic) and the
destruction of democracy – as a basis for the rejection of
partisan, particular (relative) values in favour of a shared
national identity (the universal), I turn to Kwame Anthony
Appiah. In his book, Cosmopolitanism: Ethics in a World of
Strangers, Appiah argues that today’s fundamentalists are
themselves of a universalist creed, engaging in the same
quest for “a universal community beyond cultures and
nations (p 140).” The debate then is not the one as
between relativists and universalists – as to why minority
cultures require special preservation as against the larger
society – but rather of competing universalities.
And in this context, the pressing question, as Appiah
frames it at p 143, is “How, in principle, to distinguish
benign and malign forms of universalisms”. For Appiah
benign universalism is cosmopolitan in character, admitting
of difference in its value for plurality:
“Cosmopolitans think that there are many values worth living
by and that you cannot live by them all. So we hope and
expect that different people and different societies will embody
different values (But they have to be values worth living by).”
Another tenet of cosmopolitanism is fallibilism: “the
sense that our knowledge is imperfect, provisional, subject
to revision in the face of new evidence” (Appiah, p 144).
This seems consistent with an outline of constitutional
justification that would have it be unapologetic in looking
to the future, clearly articulating what it is we want that
future to look like, in order to determine what it is from
the past we might wish to preserve.
For counter-cosmopolitans, or fundamentalists,
universalism issues in uniformity. This is their objective. In
cases where these universalities compete (cosmopolitan as
against counter-cosmopolitan or fundamentalist), where
they come head to head – the often overstated quandary of30
Amicus Curiae Issue 69 Spring 2007
our day – cosmopolitan beliefs are to be preferred on the
basis not of the past that they have delivered but of the
future they promise. This is a future in which we want to
“preserve a wide range of human conditions because it
allows free people the best chance to make their own lives”
(Appiah, p 105).
And so the fear of fundamentalism, of democracies’
destruction from within, can ground no coherent rejection
of multiculturalism. In fact it is the fear of fundamentalism,
of those who would have all be like them, think like them,
who would tolerate no diversity, no plurality of opinion,
that must lead us inexorably to an embrace of
multiculturalism.
What then of the second group of critics; those who fear
that multiculturalism might facilitate abuse, those who, like
Susan Moller Okin, ask “is multiculturalism bad for
women?” I fear these issues are more intractable. Already
in South Africa we have dealt with situations in which
certain sectors of our society have felt their community
rights to religious practice were violated by the prohibition
on corporal punishment in schools – a measure that sought
to guarantee the welfare of children. And the recent
Constitutional Court decision holding that the failure to
provide for same-sex marriage in our common and
statutory law infringes rights to equality and dignity has
generated enormous religious and cultural opposition in
South Africa; or, even more seriously, the intersection
between traditional law, especially relating to marriage and
inheritance, and the constitutional prescriptions on
equality and dignity.
We can in South Africa point to the Constitution and
insist that the provisions guaranteeing the rights of cultural,
religious and linguistic communities are clear in stipulating
that such rights shall not be exercised in a manner
inconsistent with any other provision in the Bill of Rights.
We can reason, as the Constitutional Court has done that:
“In the open and democratic society contemplated by the
Constitution there must be mutually respectful co-existence
between the secular and the sacred. The function of the Court
is to recognize the sphere which each inhabits, not to force the
one into the sphere of the other. The objective of the
Constitution is to allow different concepts about the nature of
human existence to inhabit the same public realm, and to do
so in a manner that is not mutually destructive and that at
the same time enables government to function in a way that
shows equal concern and respect for all.”
Still the sense among religious and cultural communities
that their practices, their ways of being, have been
diminished or are under threat, is real. And we would be
disingenuous in pretending that our Constitution always
allows for a reconciliation of rights, that it does not
sometimes require choice, the sacrifice of one right for
another.
However, much more disingenuous, I fear, are those
who take issue with certain cultural or religious practices
and beliefs on the ostensible basis that they are concerned
for the abuse of those most vulnerable within the minority
grouping when, in fact, they seek only to secure their own
comfort.
During my tenure as Minister of Education, we
produced a seminal document on Values in Education. We
said that values cannot be imposed. Diversity should be
encouraged. In schools, especially, outward showing of
dress, in particular, allows for diversity to be valued – not
only because it promotes that bland value of tolerance but
also enables our children to work and live in an
environment in which all can demonstrate their affiliations
equally and which is more likely to do that than one in
which all such signs have been artificially erased.
Mr Straw, I understand from The Economist, has received
support from his colleagues concerning his request that
Muslim women remove their veils when consulting with
him. It is a request that appears to have some resonance
with theorists like Okin concerned for women’s inequality.
However, an examination of Mr Straw’s reasons for making
such a request reveals that this concern was not foremost
in his mind.
Rather, it appears that personal levels of comfort were
most at stake when he defended his action on the basis that
comprehensive communication can be achieved only by
looking someone full in the face – ignoring as Ziauddin
Sardar reminds us (in the New Statesman of 16 October
2006) of the wealth of scholarship testifying that
communication, particularly by way of facial expression is
not universal but culturally constructed. Straw also argues
that wearing the veil is a “visible statement of separation
and difference,” and in doing so he disparages a core value
of any liberal multicultural society in which the right to be
different and belong in a participatory democratic sense is
protected, recognizing that this is what is needed to give
every individual the best chance of personal fulfillment.
A CULTURE OF CONSTITUTIONAL
JUSTIFICATION
Too often the attacks that minority cultures must
withstand, ostensibly in the name of concern for the least
well-off and most vulnerable among their number, are
sadly simply attempts to force the minority culture to
assume the ways of the majority, to insist that it assimilate.
Nonetheless we cannot afford to ignore discrimination of
vulnerable individuals – whether that be children, women,
homosexuals – wherever that occurs, whether in minority
or dominant culture and so we must take seriously
Appiah’s caution (at p 105) that: “There simply is no
decent way to sustain those communities of difference that
will not survive without the free allegiance of their
members.” 31
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My own hope is that South Africa’s culture of
constitutional justification, one grounded in an articulated
vision of the future, necessarily up for debate – where the
past really is another country – will inform the
communities and cultures of all the peoples who find their
home in South Africa. The practice of taking from the past
that which a vision for the future endorses may then
become part of the way in which we all view and approach
our own cultures and traditions.
Then, perhaps, what Salman Rushdie said of The Satanic
Verses, the novel that attracted his fatwa, might also be a
fitting description of South Africa for a country where
racial “purity” had been virtually elevated into a
constitutional principle under apartheid:
“[It] celebrates hybridity, impurity, intermingling, the
transformation that comes of new and unexpected
combinations of human beings, cultures, ideas, politics,
movies, songs. It rejoices in mongrelization and fears the
absolutism of the Pure. Mélange, hotchpotch, a bit of this
and a bit of that is how newness enters the world. It is the
great possibility that mass migration gives the world, and [it
has] tried to embrace it.”
Professor Kader Asmal
MP, National Assembly, South Africa
